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I. 
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recorded. 
1. SaUaday, for the first time on appeal, raised the argument that the 
Memorandum of Sale was proved by a subscribing witness; and therefore, 
SaUaday waived said issue and it is not properly before this Court. 
On pages eight through eleven (8 - 11) of Respondent's Reply Brief [hereinafter 
"Respondent's Brief'], Salladay alleged that, "[t]he Memorandum of Sale at issue in this case 
was 'proved' by a 'subscribing witness', [sic] a notary public, in accordance with Idaho Code§§ 
55-701, 55-718 and 55-805, and was thus properly recorded." Respondent's Brief at Pages 10, 
11. Salladay had not raised that argument in any of his briefs filed before the district court, nor 
did he allege that the Memorandum of Sale was proven pursuant to Idaho Code in any affidavits 
filed before the district court. See generally R. 
"Generally, 'an issue presented on appeal must have been properly framed and preserved 
in the court below."' Wood v. Wood, 124 Idaho 12, 16-17 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Centers v. 
Yehezkely, 109 Idaho 216, 216 (Ct. App. 1985). An appellate ourt will not consider issues that 
are raised for the first time on appeal. Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 941 (2011). 
Because Salladay failed to raise the issue of whether or not the Memorandum of Sale was proven 
pursuant to Idaho law before the district court, that issue is not properly before this Court. 
Therefore, Salladay' s argument that the Memorandum of Sale was proven, as opposed to being 
properly acknowledged, is waived; and this Court should decline to address Salladay' s 
arguments raised for the first time in this appeal. 
2. Even if Salladay did not waive the issue of whether or not the Memorandum 
of Sale was proven by a subscribing witness, it is not an instrument; and 
therefore, a subscribing witness' proof is irrelevant. 
Salladay, on page ten (10) of Respondent's Brief, quoted Idaho Code § 55-718 and 
alleged that a subscribing witness proved the Memorandum of Sale. Idaho Code § 55-718 
applies to "[p]roof of the execution of an instrument ... " Salladay further alleged that the 
Memorandum of Sale was proved by a subscribing witness in accordance with Idaho Code § 55-
805. Respondent's Brief at Pages 10, 11. 
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On pages seven through mne (7 - 9) of Appellants' Opening the Bowens 
analyzed whether or not Memorandum of was either an instrument or a 
summary instrument Idaho analysis proved 
Sale does not substantially comply with Idaho law to be deemed either an instrument or a 
legally valid summary instrument. Id. Because Idaho Code§ 55-718 applies to the "[p]roof of 
execution of an instrument," the forms of proof prescribed as legal alternatives to an 
acknowledgment are inapplicable, because execution of the Memorandum of Sale is not the 
execution of an instrument. Thus, Idaho Code§ 55-718 is irrelevant in regards to the execution 
of the Memorandum of Sale. 
Further, Salladay' s allegation that the Memorandum of Sale was proved by a subscribing 
witness in accordance with Idaho Code § 55-805 also fails. Said code section applies to an 
instrument that may be recorded. Idaho Code § 55-801 states as follows: "WHAT MAY BE 
RECORDED. Any instrument or judgment affecting the title to or possession of real property 
may be recorded under this chapter." Without referencing Idaho Code§ 55-801, which states the 
context for documents that "may be recorded under this chapter," Salladay quoted Black's Law 
Dictionary to state the definition of an instrument. Respondent's Brief at Pages 11, 12. Salladay 
then asserted that the Memorandum of Sale is an instrument, but also alleged that the 
Memorandum of Sale was not a document of conveyance regarding real property. Id. at 11. 
Salladay's argument is nonsensical when viewed in the light of Idaho Code § 55-813, 
which defines a conveyance as: "[E]very instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in 
real property is created, alienated, mortgaged or encumbered, or by which title to any real 
property may be affected, except wills." (Bolded emphasis added) Salladay alleged that the 
Memorandum of Sale is an instrument but not a conveyance, even though a conveyance under 
Idaho Code § 55-801 et seq. necessarily includes "every instrument in writing" that affects "any 
estate or interest in real property" being created, alienated, mortgaged or encumbered" or any 
affect on title to real property. Salladay's argument defies logic - if the Memorandum of Sale is 
allegedly an instrument that affects an interest in real property or has any affect on the title to 
real property, by definition in Idaho Code § 55-801 et seq., it must be a conveyance, or at least a 
purported conveyance. By stating affirmatively that the Memorandum of Sale is an instrument, 
although "[t]he Memorandum of Sale is not and does not pretend to be a 'conveyance' of real 
property" (Id.), Salladay's argument does not hold muster under Idaho law. If Salladay truly 
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Memorandum of Sale is an instrument, then, logically, Salladay must also 
~,.=,~·,. of Sale is a purported conveyance to Idaho Code § 55-
7 8. cannot that Memorandum of Sale is an instrument while alleging that 
it is not a conveyance. Salladay cannot eat his cake and then have it too. By Salladay' s 
admission, the Memorandum of Sale is not an instrument; and thus, his argument fails. 
Therefore, even if a subscribing witness had provided legally sufficient proof of the 
Memorandum of Sale's execution, such proof would be irrelevant to the issues before this Court. 
3. Salladay's alleged proof of the Memorandum of Sale by a subscribing 
witness does not comply with Idaho law. 
While the Bowens continue to assert that the Memorandum of Sale is not an instrument 
pursuant to Idaho law, even if the Bowens' assertion is mistaken and this Court finds that the 
Memorandum of Sale is an instrument that was purportedly proven by a subscribing witness, the 
alleged proof that it is an instrument fails to comply with Idaho law. Idaho Code§ 55-719 states 
as follows: 
Identity of Witness must be known or proved. - If by a 
subscribing witness such witness must be personally known to the officer 
taking the proof, to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
instrument, as a witness, or must be proved to be such by the oath of a 
credible witness. 
Idaho Code § 55-720 states as follows: 
Proof of identity of grantor. - The subscribing witness must 
prove that the person whose name is subscribed to the instrument as a 
party is the person described in it and that such person executed it, and 
that the witness subscribed his name thereto as a witness. 
Idaho Code § 55-723 states as follows: 
Certificate of proof. - An officer taking proof of the execution of 
any instrument must, in his certificate indorsed thereon or attached thereto, 
set forth all the matters required by law to be done or known by him, or 
proved before him on the proceeding, together with the names of all the 
witnesses examined before him, their places of residence respectively, and 
the substance of their testimony. 
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By alleging, for the first time on appeal, that the Memorandum of Sale is an instrument 
was proven by a subscribing the proof must substantially comply with the 
requirements set Code § et Instead even attempting to prove that 
said code sections were complied with, Salladay merely quoted Idaho Code §§ 55-701 and 55-
718, stated the definition of an instrument from a 1969 edition of Black's Law Dictionary, and 
concluded that, "The Memorandum of Sale at issue in this case was 'proved' by a 'subscribing 
witness', [sic] a notary public, in accordance with Idaho Code §§ 55-701, 55-718 and 55-805, 
and was thus properly recorded." Respondent's Brief at 10, 11. Not so fast! 
The Memorandum of Sale does not contain a Certificate of Proof at all, much less one 
that any court can find substantially complies with Idaho Code§ 55-723. There is no certificate 
indorsed on or attached to the Memorandum of Sale. Such a certificate would have to "set forth 
all matters required by law to be done or known by [the officer taking proof of the execution of 
the Memorandum of Sale], or proved before [said officer] on the proceeding, together with the 
names of all the witnesses examined before [said officer], their places of residence respectively, 
and the substance of their testimony," in accordance with Idaho Code § 55-723. Thus, 
Salladay's alleged proof by a subscribing witness does not comply with Idaho Code§ 55-723. 
Further, and pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-719, Salladay's alleged "subscribing witness" 
"must be personally known to the officer taking the proof to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the [Memorandum of Sale], as a witness, or must be proved to be such by the oath 
of a credible witness." On page ten (10) of Respondent's Brief, Salladay alleged that the 
subscribing witness to the Memorandum of Sale was the notary public. There is nothing 
attached to or within the Memorandum of Sale stating that the notary public was the subscribing 
witness, nor that there was another subscribing witness known by the notary public, nor that a 
credible witness, under oath, proved that Salladay or anyone else executed the Memorandum of 
Sale. Thus, Salladay' s allegation that a subscribing witness proved the Memorandum of Sale 
fails. 
Additionally, Salladay's allegation that a subscribing witness proved the Memorandum of 
Sale fails under Idaho Code § 55-720. Said statute contemplates that a subscribing witness is 
someone other than a notary public. The subscribing witness would have to have proven to the 
notary public that Salladay, whose name was subscribed as the grantor, was the person 
described in the Memorandum of Sale, that Salladay executed the Memorandum of Sale as the 
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and that the witness also subscribed his or her name to Memorandum of Sale as a 
Memorandum of Sale does not any signatures other than Salladay's and the 
s, are clearly insufficient to comply with Code § are 
there any statements in, or attached to, the Memorandum of Sale that a witness knew Salladay to 
be the person described in said document as the grantor and that Salladay executed the 
document. Thus, Salladay's allegation that a subscribing witness proved the Memorandum of 
Sale also fails pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-720. 
4. Salladay's Memorandum of Sale is void against the Bowens pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 55-812. . 
On page eleven (11) of Respondent's Brief, Salladay alleged that the Bowens' argument that 
the Memorandum of Sale is void against them is without merit based solely on Salladay's 
allegations that the Memorandum of Sale was proved in accordance with Idaho law. Because the 
Bowens have just proved that Salladay' s Memorandum of Sale was not proved in accordance 
with Idaho law, it is Salladay's allegation that is without merit. As proven by the Bowens in 
their opening brief - that the Memorandum of Sale is void against them because it was not 
acknowledged in accordance with Idaho law, an argument that Salladay failed to refute in 
Respondent's Brief, and therefore, said argument was conceded or waived. The Bowens have 
also proved that the Memorandum of Sale was not proved in accordance with Idaho law. Thus, 
Salladay's Memorandum of Sale is void against the Bowens' tax deed because it was neither 
acknowledged nor proved in accordance with Idaho law. 
Salladay goes on to contend that the Memorandum of Sale is both an instrument entitled to 
be recorded and a legally valid summary instrument. Respondent's Brief at 11 - 15. As already 
refuted in this brief, Salladay' s argument that the Memorandum of Sale is an instrument based 
upon a definition provided in a 1969 version of Black's Law Dictionary and without referencing 
and considering the context of additional statutes under Idaho Code§ 55-701 et seq. and Idaho 
Code § 55-801 et seq., fails in light of Idaho law. Black's Law Dictionary is an excellent 
resource for legal practitioners to use to help them understand the meanings of words in the legal 
field. It is an excellent supplement when one tries to understand a definition within the context 
of the law. Black's Law Dictionary, however, is not the law - and it is not Idaho law! The 
definition of an instrument may be helpful to understand when one reads a statute; but its 
definitions cannot replace the context and clear wording of statutes. Pursuant to Idaho law, the 
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Memorandum Sale is not an instrument that was entitled to be recorded. As a necessary 
allegations Memorandum Sale is an instrument to be 
Salladay's argument that the Memorandum of Sale is a legally valid summary instrument 
also fails. On page 13 of Respondent's Brief, Salladay alleged that a notary public proved the 
granter's signature. Because the Bowens have already proven that the Memorandum of Sale was 
neither acknowledged nor proved in accordance with Idaho law, the rest of Salladay's allegations 
and arguments fail. The Bowens have already thoroughly analyzed and proven that the 
Memorandum of Sale does not substantially comply with the requirements of Idaho law to be 
considered a a legally valid summary instrument on pages nine and ten (9 & 10) of Appellants' 
Opening Brief The Bowens will not repeat their analysis and conclusions to the intelligent 
members of this Court. There is nothing in Respondent's Brief regarding this issue that warrants 
additional argument; therefore, the Bowens rest upon their arguments already made. 
B. The District Court erred when it held that even if the Memorandum of Sale was not 
properly recorded, that CILD was required to provide notice of the pending tax-deed sale 
to Salladay. 
On pages 16 - 20 of Respondent's Brief, Salladay makes false allegations regarding the 
Bowens' arguments in their opening brief. Salladay alleged that the "Bowens failed ... to argue 
the asserted error set forth in the title of subsection "B" of their argument." Id. at 16. Salladay 
also alleged that the Bowens agreed that a statement in a letter from CILD's attorney "was an 
admission of a party opponent .... " and that "[t]he court properly refused to strike the 
statement." Id. Salladay further falsely alleged as follows: "Contrary to the Bowens' startling 
assertion that there is nothing in the record to indicate that [Salladay] did not receive notice of 
the sale, the record includes substantial evidence to that effect .... " Id. at 17. 
The Bowens did not fail to argue that the district court erred when it held that even if the 
Memorandum of Sale was not properly recorded, that CILD was required to provide notice of the 
pending tax-deed sale to Salladay. The Bowens stated that, "While the district court held that 
CILD failed to locate the Memorandum of Sale, resulting in Salladay not receiving notice of 
the sale (R. p. 113 L. 23 - p. 114 L. 1 - 3), there is simply no evidence in the record to support 
that finding. See generally R. Appellants' Opening Brief, Page 10 (bolded emphasis added). 
Salladay misconstrued the Bowens' argument and failed to refute it, thereby conceding that 
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argument. There is not a scintilla of evidence the record to support a decision that CILD 
to the Memorandum of Sale. 
The Bowens concede that Salladay not a letter regarding 
sale, but the reason for that is unknown. While the Bowens do not argue that CILD did actually 
locate the Memorandum of Sale, the Bowens do not concede that the reason that Salladay did not 
receive a notice letter was because CILD failed to locate the Memorandum of Sale. It is quite 
possible that CILD indeed located the Memorandum of Sale, saw that the document stated that 
the property had already been sold, and as a result, CILD provided notice to only Kelly Jo 
Stroud. We simply do not know if that is true, just as we do not know if CILD failed to locate 
the Memorandum of Sale. It is quite plausible, however, that CILD located the Memorandum of 
Sale and, pursuant to its present perfect tense language, sent a notice letter to Mr. Stroud. There 
is not a scintilla of evidence in the record regarding why Salladay did not receive notice - CILD 
did not provide an affidavit regarding that issue or any other - so the district court's finding that 
the reason that Salladay did not receive notice was because CILD failed to locate the 
Memorandum of Sale is unsupported by the record. 
The subsequent section in the Bowens' Opening Brief, that explains the present perfect 
tense language in the Memorandum of Sale, shows that it may have been located; but based on 
the document's plain language, it is reasonable to infer that CILD did not send a notice letter to 
Salladay not because the document was not located, but instead, because it was and the plain 
language may have led CILD to conclude that Salladay had already sold the property, and 
therefore, there was no reason to send him notice. Those arguments directly support that the 
Bowens did argue their point that the district court's holding was not based upon evidence; and 
therefore, it was made in error. 
Regarding Salladay's allegation that the Bowens agreed that a letter written by CILD's 
attorney was an admission of a party opponent and that the court properly refused to strike the 
document, the former argument was made out of context and is deceitful, while the latter is 
simply false. While Respondent's Brief cited to part of the transcript regarding oral arguments 
before the district court, it did not cite to the entire section of the transcript regarding those 
arguments. The entire oral argument regarding the Bowens' Objection and Motion to Strike 
must be reviewed to understand the context of the arguments made regarding the issue of how 
the Bowens refuted Salladay' s argument that statements in the letter are admissions of a part'f 
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opponent. While Salladay' s citation to the record left off at Tr. p. 19 L. 2 and resumed at p. 20 
Tr. p. 19 6 - p. 28 L. which contains the entire dialogue between 
court the parties regarding the Objection and Motion to Strike. Specifically regarding the 
whether or not the letter or parts thereof should come into evidence as an admission of a 
party opponent, the Bowens ask this Court to review the context of the arguments made, 
including that the statement is an admission of the plaintiffs party opponent technically, 
although in reality CILD is not a party opponent to Salladay. Tr. p. 16 L. 16 19; p. 22 L. 20 -
p. 20 L. 19. Review of the transcript in context shows clearly that the Bowens did not concede 
that the letter from CILD' s attorney was an admissible admission of a party opponent. In 
addition and despite Salladay' s unsupported allegation that the district court properly refused to 
strike the letter, the district court never ruled on the issue. See generally Tr. and R. 
C. CILD was not required to provide notice of the pending tax-deed sale to Salladay. 
In section "C" of Respondent's Brief, Salladay argues that the district court did not err by 
remanding the case at bar to CILD because Salladay was entitled to receive notice of the tax-
deed's pending issuance. Salladay's entire argument, however, is based upon the presumption 
that he was entitled to receive notice of the tax-deed sale, which the Bowens have thoroughly 
refuted in both their opening brief and in the preceding sections of this brief. Idaho Code § 43-
7 l 4A(6) defines a party in interest as follows: "Party in interest" means a person or persons, 
partnership, corporation, business venture, or other entity which holds a valid and legally binding 
purchase contract, mortgage or deed of trust, properly recorded, in and for the property for 
which a delinquency entry has been made" (bolded emphasis added). Salladay holds neither a 
purchase contract, mortgage nor deed of trust for the subject property. Even if the Memorandum 
of Sale was a legally valid purchase contract, mortgage or deed of trust, it was not proven or 
authenticated pursuant to Idaho law; and therefore, it was not entitled to be recorded. Thus, 
Salladay was not entitled to receive notice of the tax-deed sale. 
Salladay further argues that he is a record owner of the subject property. The only 
evidence in the record supporting that allegation is paragraph two (2) of Salladay's affidavit, 
filed May 8, 2015, in which he alleges that the Troutner Estate is the owner of the subject 
property. Because there is not any documentary evidence in the record supporting Salladay's 
allegation, there was not a basis for the district court to hold that he was entitled to receive notice 
of the tax-deed sale. The district court, however, did make such a holding on Page 8 of its Order 
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Denying Motion for Reconsideration, entered August 4, 2015. The Bowens infer, based upon 
vv, .. u,.., .... ..., allegation that all times relevant to this litigation," the record 
owner subject property (Respondent's Page and based upon the district court's 
conclusion that, if Salladay was the record owner of the property, CILD was still legally required 
to provide notice to [Salladay ]" (Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Page 8), that both 
Salladay and the district court believe that CILD was required to search previously recorded 
documents regarding the subject property to determine which parties were to receive notice. Not 
one of the cases cited in the Bowens' Opening Brief, this brief, or when Bowens' counsel 
researched the issue of notice in regards to a document that was not properly recorded, state that 
when a party is not entitled to receive notice based upon a document that was not properly 
recorded that an irrigation district is required to look back further to other documents in the 
recorder's office. Salladay had sufficient opportunity before this case was appealed to provide a 
document that supports his allegation that he is the record owner of the property. He did not do 
so. Thus, Salladay' s argument that he was entitled to receive notice of the tax-deed sale because 
he was a record owner is without merit. 
D. Salladay's remaining arguments have already been sufficiently refuted. 
The Bowens have already refuted Salladay's remaining substantive arguments throughout 
the remainder of Respondent's Brief in the Bowens' Opening Brief. The Bowens, however, 
respond to two stylistic arguments contained on pages 27 and 29 of Respondent's Brief. On 
page 27, Salladay states: "Thus the Bowens have wasted all of the vigor and ingenuity in their 
arguments, because even if they prevail on those points, the District Court was still correct in its 
conclusion that the Estate was entitled to notice of the deficiency and pending issuance of the tax 
deed." Two pages later, Salladay alleged that, "this appeal is frivolous." Salladay made such 
allegations in this case previously, but his allegation on Page 27 of Respondent's Brief, that the 
Bowens' arguments show "ingenuity," obviously refute Salladay's allegation that this appeal is 
frivolous. The Bowens agree with Salladay's citation to Idaho Code§ 43-719(5), which states: 
"All costs and fees of any hearing or proceeding shall be awarded to the prevailing party." The 
Bowens hereby renew their request to be awarded attorneys' fees and costs in this appeal and the 
underlying case. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Memorandum of Sale was neither properly acknowledged nor proved accordance 
and therefore, it was not properly recorded. Because Memorandum Sale 
was not properly recorded, it imparted constructive notice to no one and CILD was not required 
to provide notice of the pending tax-deed sale to Salladay. Further, because Salladay failed to 
record a legally valid instrument or summary instrument, his Memorandum of Sale is void 
against the Bowens pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-812. CILD was not required to search the 
recorder's office for previously recorded documents to determine which persons or entities were 
required to receive notice of tax delinquencies and the tax-deed sale. There is no case law to 
support such a holding and, regardless, Salladay did not provide any documentary evidence that 
he was the record owner of the subject property prior to his illegal recording of the Memorandum 
of Sale. Salladay's petition to the district court was untimely. Based upon the foregoing law, 
authority, and analysis, the Bowens respectfully ask this Court to reverse the district court and 
find that Salladay' s petition must be dismissed based upon one or more of the reasons argued in 
this brief and in the Bowens' Opening Brief. The Bowens further ask this Court to award them 
their attorneys' fees and costs both in the underlying action and in this appeal. 
:\\..\~ 
Respectfully submitted this_ day of May 2016. 
O'CONNOR LAW, PLLC 
William J. O'Connor 
Attorney for Eric & Kathryn Bowen 
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